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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
E. L. MURPHY TRUCKING COMPANY.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
Case No.
CLIMATE CONTROL, INC.,
13555
Defendant-Respondent,
vs.
AMERICAN STANDARD, INC.,
Co-Defendant - Co-Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by an interstate motor carrier to
recover freight charges from the manufacturer and from
the recipient of certain goods transported by the carrier.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District
Court for the Third Judicial District, Stewart M. Hanson,
granted the motions for summary judgment of respondent
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Climate Control, Inc., and of co-respondent American
Standard, Inc., and denied appellant's motion for summary judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents ask this Court to affirm the order and
judgment of the court below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
.. Respondent Climate Control, Inc. and co-respondent
American Standard, Inc. accept appellant's statement of
facts of the case except for the statement in paragraph
11 on page 4 of appellant's brief, to the effect that "E. L.
Murphy Trucking Company virtually had daily communications with the East Coast Drayage Company from the
date of billing including personal visits . . ." While this
assertion seems immaterial to the issues presented by the
appeal, these assertions are nowhere supported in the
record. In addition, appellant's statement of facts fails
to state that unequivocal demand for payment was not
made by appellant upon co-respondent American Standard, Inc. until July 11, 1972 (R-100), and fails to state
that demand for payment was not made by appellant upon
respondent Climate Control until September 28, 1972
(R-104).
In the interest of clarity, however, these parties present the following summary of the transactions from which
this lawsuit arises. In late 1971, Climate Control ordered
some large air conditioning units from American Stan-
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dard's predecessor in interest in this matter. The contract
under which these units were sold prescribed that American Standard would prepay the freight charges necessary
to ship the units from Carteret, New Jersey, to Salt Lake
City, Utah. American Standard contracted with a New
Jersey company called B & M Trading to have the air
conditioning units shipped to Salt Lake. B & M Trading
in turn contracted with another New Jersey company,
East Coast Drayage Company, to ship the units. Finally,
East Coast Drayage Company contracted with plaintiff,
E. L. Murphy Trucking Company, to transport the air
conditioning units to Salt Lake City. Murphy Trucking
Company accepted the air conditioning units for shipment
on November 5, 1971, and prepared four bills of lading,
one of which was applicable to each of the four truckloads
to air conditioning equipment in question. As indicated
in appellant's Statement of Facts, one of these documents
stated that the freight charges were "prepaid," one indicated that the freight charges were "to be prepaid," and
two of the bills omitted any notation about prepayment
of freight charges. Each of Murphy Trucking's four bills
of lading, however, state: "Bill To: East Coast Drayage
Corporation, 901 East Linden Ave., Linden, New Jersey
07036" (R-lll, -113, -115, -117). It is undisputed that
all of the bills of lading prepared by American Standard
stated that the freight charges were "to be prepaid" (R46-57). Plaintiff transported the four truckloads of air
conditioning units to Salt Lake City between about November 16 and November 19, 1971, and delivered them
to Climate Control with Murphy Trucking's bills of lad-
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ing referred to above, and without making any demand
for payment upon Climate Control or American Standard.
Appellant billed East Coast Drayage Company for
the shipping charges on November 17 and 18, 1971. Over
the next several months, Murphy Trucking attempted to
collect its freight charges from East Coast Drayage (R83-90). Almost four months after delivery of the shipment, Murphy Trucking Company's attorneys discovered
that East Coast Drayage Company was apparently in
financial difficulty and was unlikely to be able to pay
the freight charges in question (R-91). Plaintiff first
made demand for payment of these charges on American
Standard on July 11, 1972, almost six months after delivering the goods (R-100) and first made demand on
Climate Control on September 28,1972, some nine months
after delivering the goods in question (R-104).
In the meantime, American Standard had made payment for these shipping charges to B & M Trading Company on November 9, 1971, shortly after the goods were
picked up (R-40), and Climate Control had completed
payment of the price of the air conditioning units and
freight charges to American Standard on January 14,1972
(R-124).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING DOUBLE LIABILITY AGAINST
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EITHER AMERICAN STANDARD OR CLIMATE CONTROL.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether E. L.
Murphy Trucking Company is estopped from claiming
that either Climate Control or American Standard, each
having once paid the freight charges at issue in this case,
is liable to pay them a second time to appellant.
Climate Control and American Standard contend that
this case is governed by the holdings of Consolidated
Freightways Corporation v. Admiral Corporation, 442 F.
2d 56 (7th Cir. 1971), and Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. National Milling Company, 409 F. 2d 882 (3rd
Cir. 1969), and that those cases hold that appellant is
estopped from asserting its claim of double liability against
either Climate Control or American Standard.
In the Admiral case, some electrical components imported from Japan had been shipped from their arrival
port on the west coast to Admiral's plants in Illinois under a contract in which a west coast shipper arranged
customs clearance for the imported goods and then selected a motor carrier to transport the goods inland. The
shipper agreed to prepay the freight charges in question.
The plaintiff carrier prepared bills of lading which stated
that Admiral was the consignee, and that the shipper was
the party to be billed (emphasis added). The bills of
lading also stated that the freight charges had been prepaid, or were to be prepaid. The carrier delivered the
goods to the consignee without making demand for pay-
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ment, without reserving any right to claim payment from
the consignee or the manufacturer in the event it was unable to collect from the shipper, and without notifying
the consignee that it had not been paid by the shipper.
Following delivery of the goods, Admiral, as consignee,
paid the freight charges to the shipper. The carrier tried
in turn to collect the prepaid freight charges from the
shipper, but was unable to do so because the shipper had
gone out of business. The Seventh Circuit held that because of the representations it had made on its bills of
lading, and because of its failure to notify the consignee
of the true nature of its credit transactions with the shipper, the carrier was estopped from asserting its claim that
the consignee was liable to pay the freight charges in
question a second time. In the National Milling case
the carrier had incorrectly indicated on the bills of lading
which it delivered with the goods in question that the
freight charges at issue had been paid by the shipper,
and had in effect directed the consignee to reimburse the
shipper. The Third Circuit also held that the carrier was
estopped from claiming double liability against the consignee.
Appellant claims that two of the facts of this case are
sufficient to distinguish the National Milling and Admiral
cases. The first such fact relied upon by appellant is the
fact that two of the four bills of lading delivered with this
shipment were not marked "prepaid" or "to be prepaid."
The second fact relied upon by appellant is the fact that
the affidavit of Mr. John Dillon states that payment by
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Climate Control to American Standard for the shipping
charges in question was based upon the American Standard's bills of lading which recited the fact that all freight
charges involved in this transaction were to be prepaid
(R-46-57), and upon the assurance that the goods specified in the invoices had in fact been received by Climate
Control, rather than upon the invoices of E. L. Murphy
Trucking Company (R-19-20).
The omission by appellant of the notation "prepaid"
or "to be prepaid" from two of its own bills of lading does
not distinguish the cases relied upon by respondents. The
Admiral opinion states explicitly that the bills of lading
at issue there showed two things: (1) The shipper was
designated as the party to be billed rather than the consignee; (2) The bills were marked "prepaid" or "to be
prepaid." The opinion relies principally on the fact that
the bills showed that the shipper was the party to be
billed, and only secondarily on whether they contained
the "prepaid" or "to be prepaid" notation. In a footnote
to the opinion, the question of whether the notations
regarding prepayment indicated that payment had actually been made by the shipper was treated as immaterial
(442 F. 2d at 58 n. 1). The Court was apparently concerned only that the "prepaid" or "to be prepaid" notations were consistent with the decisive fact about the bills
— the statement that the carrier intended to look to the
shipper for payment. Appellant's argument overlooks the
fact that each of appellant's bills of lading which was presented to Climate Control affirmatively represented that
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appellant also looked to the shipper for payment, and expected no payment from Climate Control in return for the
delivery of the goods. The decision in National Milling
also hinged on the fact that the bills in question, construed
in the light of the transaction in question, "in effect directed the consignee to reimburse the shipper" (409 F. 2d
at 883).
Neither does the affidavit of John Dillon distinguish
this case from National Milling and Admiral. The issue
of defendant's reliance on plaintiff's representations was
not raised in National Milling. The specific argument
which appellant makes here was presented and rejected
in Admiral. Plaintiff there argued that the consignee
could not assert estoppel because it had not relied upon
the representations of prepayment in making its reimbursement to the shipper. The Court rejected that argument and ruled that in the absence of evidence that the
consignee had actual knowledge of the fact that the transaction was not as the carrier's bills represented it to be,
the carrier would be estopped from seeking a second payment from the consignee. Respondents contend that were
this Court to accept the argument presented by appellant, a carrier could frustrate the intentions of the parties
to any prepaid freight transaction by simply omitting the
"prepaid" notation from its own bills of lading. The carrier could then accept the benefits of its participation in
the transaction in the event the freight charges were
promptly paid, but could avoid the burden of looking to
the shipper rather than to the consignee for payment in
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the event the shipper proved unable to pay. Such a result
would be contrary to the equitable principle, applicable to
estoppel in pais, that a party may not retain the benefits
of an agreement while repudiating its burden. Contractors
Dump Truck Service, Inc. v Gregg Const, Co,9 46 Cal.
Rptr. 738 (Cal. App. 19135); Holt \ Ravani, 34 Cal. Rptr.
417 (Cal. App. 1963).
Respondents further contend that appellant's argument that detrimental reliance must be shown to have
been based upon the specific representation made by appellant regarding prepayment is contrary to the rule that
where a party has ratified a contract, he will be estopped
to assert a proposition contrary to that contract regardless of prejudice to the other party. The party who has
ratified a contract is not bound by the terms of the agreement he ratified because the other party has been prejudiced thereby. He is bound by the agreement because he
intended to be bound. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and
Waiver § 31. It is undisputed here that appellant
deliberately agreed to participate in the prepaid freight
agreement, and it is undisputed that appellant had actual
knowledge at all material times that it was participating
in a prepaid freight transaction.
Respondents further contend that this portion of
appellant's agreement overlooks the fact that estoppel
may be based upon silence despite a duty to speak.
The applicable Interstate Commerce Commission
regulations imposed upon appellant the responsibility for
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deciding whether to accept the goods in question from the
shipper without first receiving payment. These regulations
state: "upon taking precautions deemed by them to be
sufficient to assure payment of the tariff charges within
the credit period herein specified, common carriers by motor vehicle may relinquish possession of freight in advance
of the payment of the delivery charges thereon and
may extend credit in the amount of such charges to those
who undertake to pay them, such persons herein being
called shippers, for a period of seven days excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays." 49 C. F. R. § 1322.1
(1972). Appellant is in effect asking this Court to amend
this federal regulation so as to relieve appellant from the
obligation to assume responsibility for the selection of
those persons or businesses to whom it extends credit.
Murphy Trucking, by its election to participate in the prepaid freight transaction in question, became bound by the
terms of the agreement it had ratified between American
Standard and Climate Control. American Standard and
Climate control were entitled to assume that appellant
would fulfill its obligations under the I. C. C. regulations
quoted above. In the event appellant intended to assert
any claim contrary to those expectations which were the
logical consequence of its agreement with American Standard and Climate Control, the Admiral case requires that
the carrier communicate that contrary intention or be
estopped from asserting once it becomes clear that the
shipper turned out to be a bad credit risk.
Those inferences reasonably to be drawn from all of
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the facts and circumstances of this case indicate that the
single statement relied on by appellant from the affidavit
of Mr. John Dillon (Brief of Appellant at 5) does not
negate the conclusion that Climate Control relied upon
the assertions and the inferences of appellant in making
payment to American Standard for the shipping charges
in question. Read in its entirety and construed in the
light of the nature of the transaction involved, the affidavit of Mr. John Dillon indicates that in making payment to American Standard, Climate Control was relying
upon the belief that those expectations reasonably to be
inferred from their contract with American Standard had
been fully consummated. Murphy Trucking affirmatively
represented, by stating on all of the bills of lading that
it was looking to East Coast Drayage for payment, by
verifying on two of the bills of lading that it knew it was
participating in a freight prepaid transaction, and by delivering the air conditioning units without communicating
any demand for payment, that Murphy Trucking had
ratified the transaction and was content to abide by those
expectations which Climate Control and American Standard had established by their agreement governing the
freight charges.
Similarly, appellant's claim that, in making payment
to American Standard, Climate Control was only doing
something it was legally obligated to do is without merit,
The Admiral case specifically states that the consignee
has no duty to expose himself to the risk of double liability (442 F. 2d at 59). The case of Northern State Con-
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struction Company v. Robbins, 457 P. 2d 187 (Wash.
1969), cited by appellant, involves promissory estoppel,
a substitute for consideration, and is not in point here.
POINT II.
APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO BASIS IN
LAW FOR ITS CLAIM OF L I A B I L I T Y
A G A I N S T EITHER AMERICAN STANDARD OR CLIMATE CONTROL.
The line of cases, including Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
Chicago & St. Louis Railroad v. Fink, 259 U. S. 577, 40
S. Ct. 27 (1919), and Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central
Iron and Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59, 44 S. Ct. 441 (1924), cited
in appellant's brief as standing for the proposition that
the consignee should be presumed liable for payment of
freight charges absent a showing that he is an agent with
no beneficial interest in the shipped property have no
application at all to the facts of this case. The Admiral
and National Milling cases and Consolidated Freightways
Corp. v. Eddy, 513 P. 2d 1161 (Ore. 1973), relied on by
appellant, all clearly distinguish the Fink and Central
Iron line of cases. These cases, referred to as "under
charge" cases in the Admiral (442 F. 2d at 62) and Eddy
(513 P. 2d at 1164) opinions, deal with whether a consignee could assert that a public carrier was estopped
from collecting the full rate prescribed under its ICC
tariffs for the shipment in question. None of these cases
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raised the issue of whether or not the consignee was liable.
In each of these cases it was conceded that the consignee
owed some liability to the carrier. The only issue presented was whether the consignee could assert that the
carrier was estopped from recovering the full tariff rate
by virtue of the fact that the carrier had in some way
represented that it would accept a lesser rate. The
rationale of these cases, as noted in the Eddy opinion
(513 P. 2d at 1165) is simply that a consignee or a shipper are conclusively presumed to know the tariff rate and
will therefore not be permitted to assert estoppel against
the carrier where the carrier has represented that it will
accept payment in a lesser amount as satisfaction of its
freight charges. Estoppel might be equitable in the "undercharge" cases, but its application could frustrate the
prevention of rebates which is the underlying purpose
of the ICC statutes relied on by appellant.
The issue presented by this appeal concerns not the
amount of the freight charges, but whether appellant can
assert any claim of liability against respondents. A careful
reading of the Admiral, National Milling, and Eddy cases
shows that those cases have established the proposition
that the determination of the question presented here —
whether Murphy Trucking can assert any claim for double payment against either Climate Control or American
Standard is simply not governed by the ICC statutes
cited in appellant's brief (513 P. 2d at 1165). The Eddy
case, relied upon by appellant in its brief, says:
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When the question is not the amount of the
freight charge, but merely which party is to be
responsible for paying that amount, the possibility of discrimination in rates is not involved.
The purpose of the legislation is not thwarted
by holding that a carrier may be estopped to collect its freight charges from the consignee, and
must look solely to the shipper (513 P. 2d at
1165),
It necessarily follows that the contention expressed in
Appellant's brief to the effect that under the facts of this
case "both the consignor and the consignee are both contractually and or statutorily liable for all goods transported by a carrier". (Brief of Appellant at 14) is simply
wrong under the holdings of the very cases cited by appellant. Respondents contend that the single proposition
which it is most important that this Court see in those
cases cited by both respondents and appellant is the fact
that the sole issue presented by this appeal—whether any
liability exists to the appellant from either of the respondents — has not been dealt with at all in the ICC statutes or regulations, but has been left to be determined
by contractual agreement by the parties to each individual
shipping transaction. This proposition is clearly stated in
the Admiral opinion:
The undercharge cases are thus consistent
with and, indeed, support our conclusion that
Section 223 was not intended to fasten a rigid liability upon a consignee. Congress left the initial
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determination of a party's liability for freight
charges to express contractual agreement or implication of law. So long as payment of the
full tariff charges may be demanded from some
party, the anti-discrimination policy of the Section is satisfied. Congress did not undertake to
settle all issues of collection with the enactment
of Section 223. Nor did Congress intend to
fashion a sword to insure collection in every instance and a shield to insulate the carrier from
the legal consequences of otherwise negligent or
inequitable conduct. (442 F. 2d at 62, citations
omitted.)
Of all of the cases cited in appellant's brief only three,
the Admiral, National Milling, and Eddy cases, deal with
the specific issue presented here — in a prepaid freight
transaction, what acts or omissions on the part of the
carrier will, as a matter of law, estop the carrier from
attempting to collect double payment of the freight
charges in question from the originating shipper or
the consignee? Respondents contend that the entire
argument presented by appellant is fatally flawed in that
it fails to recognize that these cases require that a prepaid
freight transaction be treated differently from the normal
shipping transaction. When viewed in the light of the
underlying purpose and policies of the ICC statutes and
regulations, the distinction thus recognized between a
shipment in which freight charges have been prepaid and
one in which they have not been prepaid makes good
sense. The carrier's normal recourse against a non-paying
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consignee would be to refuse to deliver the goods shipped.
In such a situation, it makes good sense for the carrier
to be able to deliver the goods without relinquishing its
claim of liability against the parties to the sale of the
goods. These parties have had the benefit of the carrier's
services, and have not paid any money for those services.
In the case of a shipment involving prepaid freight, the
parties to the contract for the sale and shipment of the
goods have themselves included in their contract a provision which accrues to the benefit of the carrier. In a prepaid freight situation, the parties to this original contract
have performed an affirmative act which should be expected
to have the effect of increasing the carrier's assurance
that it will receive payment for its services, and of accelerating the time at which it will receive such payment.
This being true, it makes eminent good sense to require
that in the event the carrier wishes to assert a claim of
liability which would have the effect of disrupting the
expectations thus established between the parties to the
original contract for the sale of the goods, which the carrier has ratified, the carrier must assume the burden of
clearly and promptly communicating his contrary intention to any of the other parties as against whom he wishes
to preserve his right to claim liability. Respondents content that this, and no less, is what the Admiral, and National Milling cases require of a carrier in order to preserve any right to later assert a claim of double liability
such as is presented here.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
Respondents further contend that the Admiral, National Milling and Eddy cases stand for the proposition
that estopping the carrier from subjecting a consignee,
or a party in American Standard's position, to possible
double liability for freight charges which it has already
paid does not present a situation in which the equitable
principles of estoppel can be applied to frustrate in any
way the statutory purposes of the IOC acts and regulations. While it is true that the ICC regulation quoted
above has been held not to be for the benefit of the consignee, it is equally true that the ICC statutes and regulations do not impose any presumption of double liability
for the benefit of the carrier. As the Seventh Circuit
stated in the Admiral case:
Requiring double payment of the charge by [the
consignee] would not further the statutory policy of preventing "unjust discrimination or undue preference" . . . Permitting recovery in this
case would serve only to reward the carrier for
its unlawful as well as inequitable conduct. We
decline to turn Section 223 inside out to achieve
that anomalous result (442 F. 2d at 63).
The Admiral, National Milling and Eddy cases should
be viewed as applying all of the equitable principles of
estoppel to a specific fact situation — a prepaid freight
transaction. The application of those equitable principles
in the Admiral, and National Milling cases is consistent
with the Utah Supreme Court cases of Farmers and Mer-
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chants Bank v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation, 4
Utah 2d 155, 289 P. 2d 1045 (1955); Green v. Gam, 11
Utah 2d 375, 359 P. 2d 1050 (1961), cited by appellant
in its brief. Appellant seems to argue in its brief that in
order to support the lower court's ruling this court must
first find the Admiral and National Milling cases to be
in point and, in addition, find that the facts of this case
match the facts of the Utah cases cited above. Respondents contend that the Admiral and National Milling
cases are well-reasoned applications of the equitable principles of estoppel to the specific fact situation presented
here, and that the argument presented by appellant runs
contrary to the proposition, acknowledged by appellant
in its brief, that estoppel can not be subjected to fixed
and settled rules having universal application (Brief of
Appellant at 10).
Of all of the cases relied on by appellant, only the
Eddy case deals with a prepaid freight transaction, and
that case is distinguishable from the instant facts. In
Eddy, the court held that because the defendant consignee had failed to plead that he had relied on plaintiff's
actions, and had then subsequently failed to amend his
answer to plead the defense of estoppel after his first
demurrer had been held insufficient, the plaintiff would
not be estopped to assert its claim of liability against defendant. In the instant case appellant acknowledges
that Climate Control has pled the defense of estoppel
which the defendant had failed to plead in Eddy (Brief of
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Appellant at 6). American Standard pled affirmatively
that appellant is estopped because of its actions and because American Standard acted as it did in reliance upon
appellant's representations (R-59-60). In addition, in the
Eddy case there was
. . . no allegation that the bill of lading contained
any notation that the freight had been prepaid
and no allegation that defendant was mislead into assuming that the freight had been prepaid
by any other representations or conduct of the
carrier (513 P. 2d at 1166, emphasis added).
The fact that appellant here affirmatively represented
on its bills of lading that it would look to East Coast
Drayage for payment of the freight charges, and the
fact that the bills of lading did contain some notation
that the freight had been prepaid, distinguish the Eddy
case.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's affirmative representations that it would
look to the shipper for payment of the freight charges in
question, together with its incomplete notations of prepayment on the bills of lading, its delivery of goods without demand for payment, its failure to communicate to
either American Standard or Climate Control that it had
not in fact received payment from the shipper, and its
delay in asserting any claim for payment of the freight
charges until after both American Standard and Climate
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Control had fully paid the freight charges in question,
bring this case squarely within the holdings of the Admiral and National Milling cases. Appellant ratified the
agreement of American Standard and Climate Control,
and they were entitled to rely on their expectations that
delivery of the goods in question together with bills of
lading which affirmed Appellant's ratification of the prepaid freight arrangement would mean that the transaction had been fully consummated and that they were
safe from exposure to double liability if they completed
payment in accordance with the terms of their agreement.
Appellant had the burden of placing these parties on notice of any claims it intended to assert against them before they made payment of the freight charges, thus
changing their position to their detriment. Appellant
failed to give such notification, and, in fact, affirmatively
ratified the prepaid transaction. Under these circumstances, appellant may not now seek to impose double
liability on either of respondents, and the lower court's
ruling was, accordingly, correct.
The "over charge" cases cited by Appellant provide
no basis for imposing double liability on either American
Standard or Climate Control. While it is regrettable that
the freight charges which were paid in this case by both
American Standard and Climate Control did not reach
appellant to compensate it for its services, both the ICC
regulations and the applicable case law place the burden
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of assuming that risk upon appellant. That burden cannot, as a matter of law, be transferred to either American
Standard or Climate Control.
Respectfully submitted,
DUANE B. WELLING
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